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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In view of the arguments made in the Supplemental Respondent's Brief, this
Court has granted Mr. Cooke permission to file a Supplemental Reply Brief in order to
address the State's contention that statements allegedly made by Mr. Cooke, some of
them made seven weeks prior to the charged offense, were not "other acts" as that term
is used in I.R.E. 404.' This Supplemental Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that the
State's argument appears to mistake the concept of purported relevance with the
concept of identity

- in

other words, the State confuses the basis under which the

alleged acts could be asserted to be material to the offense with the charged act itself.
This argument misapprehends the basic framework and meaning of the analysis that
applies to "other acts" evidence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Cooke's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

Because Mr. Cooke requested leave to file a Supplemental Reply Brief in order to
address the new issue raised by the State in its Supplemental Respondent's Brief, he
will not herein address the State's arguments with regard to the appropriate standard of
review to be applied regarding the sufficiency of the evidence required to find that the
State has established the prior bad acts alleged as fact. Mr. Cooke will instead rely on
the briefing of this issue that was presented in his Supplemental Appellant's Brief.

ISSUE
Do the statements and actions alleged by the State to have been undertaken by

--

-- -

- - - -~~Mr.Gooke,during-the~course-ofseveralweeks-p.ri~tt~.b~i~s
char~edoffenses, constitute

"other acts" or "prior bad acts" evidence as those terms are used under I.R.E. 404(b)?

ARGUMENT
The Statements And Actions Alleaed Bv The State To Have Been Undertaken By
Mr. Cooke. Durinq The Course Of Several Weeks Prior To His Charqed Offenses,
Constitute "Other Acts" Or "Prior Bad Acts" Evidence As Those Terms Are Used Under
I.R.E. 404(B)
The State has asserted in its Supplemental Respondent's Brief that the alleged
statements and actions of Mr. Cooke, some of which were alleged to have been made
seven weeks prior to charged offenses, do not constitute "other acts" evidence within
the meaning of I.R.E. 404(b). A review of pertinent case law, including those authorities
relied on by the State in positing this argument, and the plain text of I.R.E. 404(b) itself
reveals this assertion to be without merit.
By its plain terms, I.R.E. 404(b) applies to all evidence of "other crimes, wrongs,
or acts." I.R.E. 404(b). The State has argued that, unless the evidence is solely offered
for proof of character of the person, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, it is not
within the scope of I.R.E. 404(b). (Supplemental Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However,
this is not what the rule, or the case law interpreting the rule, provides. The State
appears to be confusing language within this rule regarding admissibility, or whether the
evidence may be put before the jury at trial, with the concept of identity, which is the
condition of being the same with something described or asserted. While I.R.E. 404(b)
does provide that "other acts" or "prior bad acts" evidence may be admissible for
purposes other than proof of propensity, it nowhere states that the potential admissibility
of this type of evidence somehow eradicates the distinction between the "other act" and
the charged offense. Idaho Rule 404(b) still applies to "other acts" evidence; but the
rule may not necessarily operate to prohibit the admission of the evidence, depending
upon the purpose for which the evidence is offered.

This is in accord with the manner in which ldaho case law has consistently
reviewed admission of other acts evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). It is initially worth

Appeals consistently recognize that prior threats fall within the purview of prior bad acts
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Araiza, 124 ldaho 82, 94, 856 P.2d 872, 884 (1993);
State v. Hoak, - I d a h o , -P . 3 d , 2009 WL 1835331, *I-3 (Ct. App. 2009);
Sfafe v. Alsanea, 138 ldaho 733, 737-740, 69 P.3d 153, 158-160 (Ct. App. 2003);
Sfafe v. Medina, 128 ldaho 19, 24-25, 909 P.2d 637, 642-643 (Ct. App. 1996); State v.
Valasquez-Delacruz, 125 ldaho 320, 322, 870 P.2d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1994).
Moreover, the standard of review regarding evidence of other crimes makes clear
that evidence is still "other acts" evidence even if it may otherwise be admissible for a
non-propensity purpose.

This standard is stated succinctly by the ldaho Court of

Appeals in State v. Blacksfead
Under Rule 404, evidence of prior crimes of wrongs is inadmissible to
prove the defendant's character or propensity to commit such acts.
Evidence of ofher crimes may be admitted, however, when relevant for
other purposes including proof of knowledge, identity, plan, preparation,
opportunity, notice, intent, or absence of mistake or accident.
State V. Blackstead, 126 ldaho 14, 17, 878 P.2d 188, 191 (Ct. App. 1994).
Under the plain language of the pertinent case law, evidence of extrinsic acts
does not cease to be "other acts" evidence merely because the issue has some
purported basis of relevance to the charged offense other than propensity.
In addition, the cases primarily relied on by the State do not stand for the
proposition that evidence of alleged threats occurring during the course of seven weeks
prior to the charged incidents are not "other acts" within the meaning of I.R.E. 404(b).

The primary case relied on by the State is State v. Sheldon, 145 ldaho 225, 178 P.3d 28
(2008).

The portion of the Sheldon Opinion relied on by the State dealt with

Mr. Sheldon's assertion that approximately $7,000 found on his person at the time that
police also located nearly a pound of methamphetamine was "other acts" evidence
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). Sheldon, 145 ldaho at 227-228, 178 P.3d at 30-31. The
Court sustained the earlier Court of Appeals' holding that the possession of the money
that was discovered at the same time as the possession of the methamphetamine was
not "other acts" evidence, but was rather physical, circumstantial evidence that was
equivalent to the discovery of any other item that would tend to demonstrate that the
person possessing the drugs was also engaged in drug dealing. Id. at 228, 178 P.3d at
31. Unlike this case, the possession of the money at issue in Sheldon was not prior to
or a separate incident than the possession of the drugs and was arguably part of the
charged act of the crime -trafficking in methamphetamine.
The State's reliance on Sfate v. ~

e iszsimilarly
~
unavailing. First, and most

important for this Court, the Nez Opinion arises out of the context of probation
revocation proceedings - proceedings under which, as the Nez Opinion itself notes, the
rules of evidence do not apply. Nez, 130 ldaho at 953, 950 P.2d at 1292. Moreover,
the allegation of the probation violation at issue was his absconding and failing to
contact his probation officers throughout the duration of the defendant's probation. Id.
at 952-954, 950 P.2d at 951-953. By the very definition of the allegation of probation
violation, this was a charge of an on-going course of conduct on the part of the

Sfate v. Nez, 130 ldaho 950, 950 P.2d 1289 (Ct. App. 1997).
5

defendant, such that each part of that course of conduct was subsumed in the
allegation. Id.
Here, the charging document does not allege a course of conduct in the relevant
charges of assault, aggravated battery, and kidnapping that would extend past the night
in question. (30187 R., pp.25-26.)

These were acts charged to have been solely

initiated and completed on the evening of January 18, 2003. As such, the Opinion in
Nez is irrelevant to this Court and does not support any contention regarding the
application of I.R.E. 404(b), since this rule did not even apply to the context at issue in
Nez.
The statements at issue in State v. Floyd, which is another case relied upon by
the State, were not similar to those at issue in this case and are therefore not instructive
for this Court. The statements in Floyd were the defendant's responses to questions by
law enforcement about the actual charged crime itself, not statements that were made
in a different context regarding a separate dispute at an earlier time than the actual
charged offense. Floyd, 125 ldaho at 652-654, 873 P.2d at 906-908. In this case,
many of Mr. Cooke's alleged statements were made seven weeks prior to the alleged
offense, and therefore could not have been statements made directly regarding events
which had not yet happened.
, similarly inapposite to the
The last case relied on by the State, State v. ~ a r l a fis
proposition that the State seeks to establish. Marlar was issued in 1972 - more than a
decade before ldaho even adopted the rules of evidence in 1985. See, e.g., State v.
Meister, -Idaho

,

P . 3 d , 2009 WL 1931217, *3 (2009). Additionally, the

State v. Floyd, 125 ldaho 651, 873 P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1994).

Marlar Opinion nowhere states that evidence of prior threats makes these threats
synonymous or identical to the act charged itself, merely that such threats may be
relevant to the charged offense. Marlar, 94 ldaho at 809, 498 P.2d 1282. As previously
noted, the text of I.R.E. 404(b) recognizes that some extrinsic acts evidence may have
logical bearing on the disputed issues at trial, but this does not, by itself, mean that it is
not evidence of other acts.
Finally, even under the State's own analysis, the State has failed to establish
how the alleged statements, some of which were made seven weeks prior to the
charged offense, are so closely related in time and relevance to the charges of assault,
battery, and kidnapping occurring months later as to be "inextricably intertwined," "part
of a single criminal episode," or "a necessary preliminary to the crime charged."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) The State provides no reasoned analysis, other than the
bald and conclusory assertion that, "Cooke's threats were part and parcel and intrinsic
to the crimes charged," to support its claim that these alleged prior incidents are not
"other acts" evidence. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.)

It is well-established that a party

waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking. See State v.
Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). The State's blanket assertion
fails on both prongs.

State v. Marlar, 94 ldaho 803,498 P.2d 1276 (1972).
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Cooke respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
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and sentence and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, he asks that th~sCourt
vacate the order denying him post-conviction relief.
DATED this 2othday of October, 2009.
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